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Abstract
We have examined and diagnosed confabulation in a 20-year-old woman who had suffered severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) when she was 12.
Spontaneous confabulations were associated with dysexecutive behavior involving perseveration and impulsiveness. The patient was amnesic
during neuropsychological tests but did not present intrusion, confabulation or false recognition. She could evoke self-constitutive autobiographi-
cal events accurately and without fantasizing. The only difference between her false and true recollections is that the patient could never envision
herself as an actor in a scene involving confabulation. She succeeded, albeit slowly, in carrying out the classic executive tests: Stroop, Trail Making
A and B and Wisconsin Card Sorting (WCST). She showed particularly slow reaction time and was impulsive and hurried in her performance of the
D2 attention test, the errands (Martin) test and the chocolate cake test. Her working memory was significantly impaired. A peculiar inability to
inhibit the generation of fictional constructions may reflect a problem in control of short-term memory. Diagnosis of the confabulation phenomenon
has had three clinical consequences: 1) information has been given to the patient, her family and other people close to her; 2) reeducation by means
of voluntary memory control prior to speaking has been proposed; 3) reporting on the case has been improved.
# 2011 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
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Re´sume´
Nous avons examine´ et porte´ le diagnostic de confabulation chez une femme de 20 ans, victime d’un traumatisme craˆnien se´ve`re a` l’aˆge de
12 ans. Les confabulations spontane´es s’associent a` un tableau dysexe´cutif comportemental avec perse´ve´rations et impulsivite´. La patiente est
amne´sique dans les tests sans intrusion, fabulation ou fausse reconnaissance. Elle e´voque correctement des e´ve´nements et savoirs autobio-
graphiques et ce qui compose son self sans fabuler. La seule diffe´rence entre les faux et les vrais souvenirs est que la patiente ne se revoit jamais
actrice de la sce`ne lors d’une confabulation. Elle re´alise quoique lentement, le Stroop, les TMT et le Wisconsin ; est tre`s lente dans les temps de
re´action ; impulsive et pre´cipite´e dans le D2, les tests des commissions et du gaˆteau au chocolat. La me´moire de travail est re´duite. La difficulte´
particulie`re a` empeˆcher la ge´ne´ration de fictions pourrait traduire un proble`me de controˆle en me´moire a` court terme. Le reconnaissance des
confabulations a eu trois conse´quences cliniques : une information sur cette situation aupre`s de la patiente, de sa famille et de son entourage ; une
proposition de re´e´ducation par controˆle volontaire du souvenir avant de parler ; un enrichissement du rapport d’expertise.
# 2011 Elsevier Masson SAS. Tous droits re´serve´s.
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Confabulations were defined by Berlyne (1972) [3] as ‘‘a
falsification of memory occurring in clear consciousness in
association with an organically derived amnesia’’. A review on.
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consciousness denotes the fact that subjects are subject to no
alteration of consciousness and differs from the dissociative
disorders that have been observed, particularly in cases of
traumatic stress. Spontaneous confabulations such as false,
non-provoked, persistent and frequently spectacular memories
are to be distinguished from provoked confabulations, which
correspond to the momentary elaboration of fantasized
responses [17] and are not always identified as ‘‘involuntary
productions of the mind’’; that is why they are considered as
lies, even though there exists no intention to deceive. Some
productions cannot be categorized; subjects confabulate
spontaneously without acting on their confabulation and they
also confabulate when ‘‘stimulated’’ by questions [15]. As for
the spontaneous confabulations that occur without having been
solicited, they share several characteristics. They do not take
place all the time, arising for example in daily life but not in
tests [6,19]. Their contents are [3] or are not [8,15]
phantasmatic. For some authors, the salient feature is that
the subject acts on them [24].
The observations reported in the literature remain few and
far between and their scarcity has impelled us to ask questions
about the necessary and sufficient conditions of confabulation.
They have been described as a major symptom of Korsakoff’s
syndrome and been found with some regularity in herpes
encephalitis, ruptured aneurysm of the anterior communicating
artery, forms of dementia such as frontotemporal lobar
degeneration (FTLD), various frontal lobe lesions and
traumatic brain injuries (TBI) [9,10,21]. In a large-scale
meta-analysis, Gilboa and Moscovitch (2002) [13] covered 39
studies and analyzed 79 observations of spontaneous con-
fabulations. In 48% of the cases presented, no damage was
found in the brain zones involved in amnesia (hippocampus,
mamillary body, thalamus), whereas the prefrontal cortex was
affected 81% of the time. No single lesion appears to be specific
to confabulation, even though the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is
frequently involved. Publications have also made mention of
isolated or, more often, associated damage to the septum, the
fornix, the cingulated cortex, the hypothalamus and the head of
the caudate nucleus. No lateralization effect has been under-
lined. On the other hand, in cases of prefrontal anterior lesion,
particularly those affecting the orbitofrontal cortex, subjects
confabulate more and longer than in the event of a posterior
lesion [25].
We are reporting in this paper on the case history of a young
woman who suffered traumatic brain injury during her
childhood; our neuropsychological observations are meant to
contribute to the ongoing discussion on confabulation.
1.1. Clinical case
In 2009, at the L’Adapt-Rhoˆne neuropsychological reed-
ucation and social support center, we made the acquaintance
of a 20-year-old woman (born on 09/30/1988) who had
suffered severe craniofacial trauma at the age of 12 (on 04/07/
2001). Her initial Glasgow score was 6 and she was in a coma
for 57 days. On 07/12/2001, the patient underwent externalventricular derivation (EVD). On 07/20/2001, she underwent
meningeal repair at the base of the skull and obstruction of the
left orbital and nasion fractures. Derivation ablation occurred
on 08/14/2001 and she was admitted to the reeducation center
on 08/27/2001. In 2002, 18 months subsequent to the trauma,
the deficiencies in the right-handed girl were summarized as
follows: Satisfactory recovery from left-sided hemiparesis,
mnesic troubles with approximately six months of post-
traumatic amnesia, deficitary anterograde verbal and visual
memory, executive function disorders, frontal dysfunction
and blindness in the left eye. Numerous examinations carried
out in a specialized medical and educational establishment
led, in 2008, to a diagnosis of ‘‘difficulties as regards
inhibition (large-scale perseverations), verbal working
memory and flexibility; temporal disorders’’. MRI tests
objectified major and diffuse sequels: bifrontal contusion with
thin corpus callosum, left frontal porencephaly and ventri-
cular dilatation. The patient had earned a French CAP
diploma as all-around food service employee, but her
internship failed on account of the above-mentioned
perseverations and behavioral troubles. She was characterized
as a ‘‘liar’’ and said to ‘‘grandstand’’. During weekly
observation periods at the center, the young woman regularly
presented with frontal disorders such as impulsiveness and
logorrhea; little by little, members of her assistance team
began to report spontaneous confabulations. She could
spontaneously recount, with no difference in terms of either
context or emotion, two memories such as those presented
below. Upon verification, only the first memory was found,
one word excepted, to be authentic ! Her father, with whom
she lived, pointed out that she ‘‘so constantly wished to say
something that it was necessary to verify what she actually
did’’. For example, she had explained to him the stress
entailed by her having to prepare a presentation of Venice and
initiate a task of which nobody had ever spoken.
Examples of ‘‘true memory’’ and total confabula-
tion:
Memory 1
Yesterday I attended a Myle` ne Farmer concert
with my father and my sister. . . We were right in
front. My father had reserved the most expensive
seats. She’s terrific! She doesn’t look her age, she
still does the splits . . . and she’s so sexy. On the
stage, there were some bras and I saw her yellow
panty, it was not pretty. . ..
Memory 2
Yesterday evening, my boyfriend came for
dinner. He’s a pain in the ass, he’s like all the
guys, you give him that and he wants that. It got
on my nerves, I had cooked up a superb meal,
some pasta with a superb sauce. We had it out;
you know how it goes with me; he ran off and I ate
it all up, it was the last thing I needed!
Table 1 (Continued )
Tests and scales Scoresa
Alternating errors TMT B 0
Stroop T score words 31
Stroop T score colors 33
T score words/colors Stroop 52
Interference score 67
Number of categories (Wisconsin) 6
T score number of errors 62
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The patient underwent a classical neuropsychological
examination (Table 1).
The main points are as follows. The intellectual quotient
(IQ) was normal. The patient was slow in taking all the tests
except for the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure (ROCF) copying
exercise and the errand test, which she carried out hurriedly, inTable 1
Overall neuropsychological assessment.
Tests and scales Scoresa
Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) WAIS-III 96




Processing speed index (PCI) WAIS-III 84
Code 7
Symbols 7
Immediate recall of Barbizet’s Lion story 10
Delayed recall of Barbizet’s Lion story 10
IMR, FR/IR 16 16
Free recalls 1,2,3, delayed 8,7,9,6
Total recall = 47/48 47
Total delayed recall 15
Indexing efficiency rating 95,8%
Recognition 16
False recognition 1
Recall of Rey’s 15 words 32
Intrusion 0
Repetition 3
Recognition of Rey’s 15 words 14
False recognition 1
Immediate serial recall (verbal BAT 144) 4,5
List learning 5,5
Learning associated pairs 4
Delayed serial recall 4
Delayed list recall 4
Delayed recognition 4
Rey picture copying time 32
Copying time 2’24
Rey picture recall 3
Immediate Serial Recall (ISR) BAT 144 5,5
Delayed Serial Recall (DSR) BAT 144 5,5
Reading span figures back and forth 5/3
Reading span words back and forth 4/2
Spatial reading span back and forth 5/4
PASAT Interrupted
Zimmermann attention assessment task (AAT) flexibility
Reaction time flexibility 777 ms (Pr 12)
Erroneous/aberrant replies 5/3
Reaction time- Selective attention task (AAT)
(Without) 305ms (Pr 4)
(With) 329ms (Pr 2)
Aberrant replies 4
Reaction time- Divided attention task (AAT) 728ms (Pr34)
Omitted/erroneous/aberrant replies 2/1/1
D2
GZ (quantitative performance indicator) 608
F (gross error indicator) 289 (48%)
GZ-F 319
SB (variance interval) 6
KL (concentration performance indicator) 92
Performance speed TMT B 82
T score number of perseverative responses 79
T score number of non-perseverative responses 63
T score conceptual level of responses 61






PASAT: Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test.
a Pathological score are expressed in italics or in bold.less than three out of the 15 minutes allotted. Her haste led to
poor performance in a test meant to assess subjects as
ecologically as possible. Moreover and even though she is fully
used to cooking at home, she encountered particularly
pronounced difficulties with the ‘‘chocolate cake’’ script [1].
There were numerous errors of all kinds: addition, inversion,
commentaries, substitution and omission. On the other hand,
she had no problems with the classic executive tests other than
her slowness in taking the fluency, Stroop and TMT tests; as for
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), she rather astonish-
ingly failed to persevere. Reading Span test results were poor.
As for the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT), a
demanding assessment of working memory in which series of
figures are not only repeated, but also tallied, it had to be
interrupted. Major difficulties were likewise observed with
regard to the D2 timed test of selective attention, which consists
in marking every single ‘‘d’’ with a dash in two adjacent lines.
The particularly high number of omissions may be explained by
inadequate working memory. In fact, the simple action of
turning over a leaf of paper when shifting from one part of a test
to the next caused her to forget the instructions. As for memory
itself, she had trouble with tests of which the encoding cannot
be controlled; on the other hand, her performances in
recognition and serial-order recall improved. It should be
noted that she did not produce intrusion or confabulations and
that false recognition remained within bounds. More infor-
mally, she was asked to tell three out of a possible six fairy tales
and she chose Little Red Riding Hood, Three Little Pigs and
Cinderella. Her narratives were rich, full of details, tinged with
humor and devoid of confabulation.
As regards biographical memory, given the patient’s youth
and the fact that the trauma occurred when she was under 12
years of age, we decided to favor autobiographical fluency tests
and an individualized questionnaire. Over the course of several
sessions, she was able to reconstruct her family tree over three
generations (24 individuals) in the correct chronological order
and she could provide some information on each person. She
Table 2
Autobiographical fluency tests.
Autobiographical fluency tests n K/R/G Actor/Spectator
Familiar names < 12 years 20 – –
Familiar names < 12–19 years 21 – –
Familiar names last year 18 – –
Event < 12 years 7 1/5/1 5/2
Event 12–19 years 7 0/5/2 5/2
Event last year 9 0/6/3 6/3
K/R/G: Know/Remember/Guess.
C. Thomas-Ante´rion et al. / Annals of Physical and Rehabilitation Medicine 55 (2012) 44–52 47accurately gave the names of those close to her and talked about
personal events or milestones; in each case, she indicated the
contents, the place, the time and the emotional climate. More
precisely, as regards each event, she managed to specify the
degree of periodicity in accordance with the Know/Remember/
Guess (K/R/G) procedure and from the standpoint of actor and
spectator alike [12,23] (Table 2). With her agreement and that
of her father, we were able to assure ourselves that the
information she had provided indeed corresponded to reality.
As for the 20 confabulations produced spontaneously during six
months of weekly meetings of which the contents were
monitored by her family or outside professionals, we noted that
on each occasion, the patient provided information about the
details, the place, the time and the emotion connected to the
episode, as was the case when she produced a true or authentic
memory. Since the K/R/G procedure could not be used
throughout the sessions (at times the patient deemed it too
difficult and declined to apply it), we asked her to approach the
memory from the standpoint of either actor or spectator. None
of the confabulations generated the ‘‘actor’’ reply and the
falsifications of the 20 true memories that in 70% of the cases
generated a specific type of response (memory 1: actor answer;
memory 2: spectator answer) were clearly distinguished.
Lastly, the patient was asked to provide in writing 20 pieces
of information pertaining to the self : I am (as in: I am my
brother’s sister, interested in food, in fine shape, in blue jeans,
too fat. . .), I have, I do. Each list was drawn up in less than three
minutes! The responses were fitting and in line with her
personality.
1.3. Discussion
The cognitive status of confabulating subjects remains quite
variable. In the literature, the role played by the dysexecutive
syndrome has been underlined repeatedly; confabulations are
likely to be associated with imitation behaviors and persevera-
tions [18], even though in some instances, this is not the case
[6]. That said, such exceptions are dated, the tests assessing
frontal dysfunction are few and far between and the
confabulations reported were essentially provoked. ‘‘Existence
of a memory deficit is an important factor explaining the
presence [the absence] of confabulation, but it is the gravity of
the executive deficit that determines the gravity of the
confabulation’’: such is the cautious conclusion of Fisher
et al. (1995) [11].The patient whose history has been reported presents a
classic clinical table of spontaneous confabulations, which are
rarely found in the literature. One of the peculiarities of her case
consists in its occurrence following severe brain injury during
childhood, at a time when the self is still being developed. It is
worth underlining how difficult it is to identify confabulations,
especially when they do not entail phantasmatic elements [6–
8]. In this case, the family believed that the young woman so
often ‘‘made things up’’ that what she said had to be verified and
that if she did so, it was on account of her ‘‘quest for identity
and need to exist’’. And notwithstanding numerous assessments
over the years along with follow-up at the reeducation center,
her verbal emissions seem to have been subsumed in a frontal
behavioral inventory associating perseverations and impul-
siveness at an age where it is supposed that children frequently
lie, especially when they are suffering. It was impossible for us
to determine whether the above symptoms arose immediately
following the trauma or as time elapsed. In the literature,
possible connections between this type of symptomatology and
the onset of confabulations have been pointed out, but a cause
and effect relation does not necessarily exist. In our patient, the
frontal behavioral inventory may have occulted confabulations
to the point where they were erroneously considered to be lies,
inventions and fantasies [16,20].
The brain damage is massive and the orbitofrontal region is
among those involved. In this particular case, it is impossible to
make any further affirmation and to draw even the slightest
anatomoclinical conclusion.
While the patient was amnesiac, we noted that in the tests,
even when asked to recount fairy tales, she did not commit
intrusion errors, fantasize or engage in false recognition [6,19].
This finding goes against a psychopathological hypothesis. The
young woman showed no signs of suggestibility (Pick, 1905)
[22]. When she failed to perform, she did not set up defense
mechanisms by giving false answers (Weinstein and Kahn,
1955) [29], nor did she resort to gap filling (Barbizet, 1963) [2].
When mentioning events or proffering autobiographical
information, the patient did not fantasize and was competent.
Our finding is congruent with the data reported by Burgess and
Shallice (1986) [4], who studied a highly particular perturba-
tion of autobiographical memory. As for Conway (2005) [5],
this author postulated that in autobiographical memory, the
long-term self constitutes a personal knowledge structure
allowing us to organize the memories we hold of our personal
experiences. The conceptual self consequently brings together
the attitudes, values and beliefs guaranteeing its own integrity
and continuity. The young woman indeed appreciated the
constitutive elements of her ‘‘self’’ when having to say I am, I
have, I do. As for her inventions, which occur in a context of
insufficient long-term memory, they do not appear to have
literally filled a biographical gap or put an end to some identity
disorder; moreover, they take place in a state of ‘‘clear
consciousness’’ [3].
The confabulations arise hurriedly and without afore-
thought, indeed, the patient has had no time to think and it
is possible to conclude that she can’t control herself (Stuss,
1978) [27] or correct herself (Shapiro, 1981) [26]. One may add
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difficulty with the flexibility and the immediate attention tests.
On the other hand, she had great difficulty taking the D2 timed
test of selective attention, in which she was penalized for her
most pronounced executive disorder, namely impulsiveness,
whereas in spite of her slow reaction time, she adequately
carried out the Stroop, TMT and Wisconsin tests. Moreover,
impulsiveness led the patient to perform the errands test ‘‘too
quickly’’ and the simple, scripted ‘‘chocolate cake’’ test [18]
was failed, as she made undue haste or had her attention
captured by a multitude of stimulations.
One possible key component of confabulation reported long
ago is the temporal factor (Van der Horst, 1932) [28]. In our
case, the patient does not present temporal disorientation,
chronological incoherence in her biographical statements, or
trouble pertaining to the conceptual ‘‘self’’. She nonetheless
associates slowness and hurriedness. Her working memory is
clearly insufficient. Even though she successfully carried out
the TEA attention assessment and Wisconsin tests, she failed to
complete the PASAT. Her peculiar inability to deter the
generation of fictions may reflect a problem of control as
regards short-term memory or ‘‘working self’’. The trouble
arises in the process of reconstructing autobiographical
memories and it encompasses a number of control processes
oriented in terms of the subject’s goals, desires and beliefs [5].
Direct access to memory is a rare occurrence and it is widely
recognized that many purportedly direct reconstructions are
largely illusory and essentially serves to safeguard the
coherence of the ‘‘self’’ (Guyard & Piolino, 2006) [14]. As
regards our patient, whose confabulations are plausible and in
no way fantasies, perhaps her plausibility control processes
have lost their effectiveness, or perhaps she did not have — or
did not take — the time to put them to work. And it is not
impossible, especially when referring to authors of past studies
[22] that the confabulations compensate for a lack in working
self and thereby ensure a form of psychic continuity that was
gravely jeopardized by the fact that the brain injury took place
at an early stage of the patient’s life.
Recognition of the existence of confabulations has entailed
three major clinical repercussions. Firstly, the neurological
symptom could be convincingly explained to the patient and
her family and the latter would no longer experience guilt over
having considered the former as ‘‘a liar’’. Secondly, the finding
facilitated the work of the expert as he elaborated his report on
the sequels of the accident, which obviously could not be
denied. Even though the patient’s cognitive capacities had to an
appreciable extent been conserved and in spite of her having
earned the French CAP diploma, the behavioral aspect of a
severe dysexecutive syndrome remained present and nega-
tively affected her family and social life. Lastly, thought was
given to the means of reining in the confabulations, of which
the patient recognized the peculiar nature, without aspiring to
put an end to them. She understood that as a step in that
direction, limiting her impulsiveness would be necessary but
not altogether sufficient. It was consequently suggested to her
that she waited before speaking and that she refrained from
speaking if the memory was something known from aspectator’s standpoint rather than a way to relive something
she remembered as an actor. At present, our data do not allow
us to reach a conclusion.
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2. Version franc¸aise
Les confabulations sont de´finies par Berlyne (1972) [3]
comme « une falsification  de la me´moire qui intervient dans
une conscience claire et en association avec une amne´sie
d’origine organique ». Pour revue voir Dalla Barba et al.,
2008 [9]. La conscience claire traduit le fait que les sujets ne
souffrent d’aucune alte´ration de celle-ci et se distingue des
troubles dissociatifs observe´s notamment lors des stress
traumatiques. On se´pare les confabulations spontane´es : faux
souvenirs non provoque´s, persistants, souvent spectaculaires,
des confabulations provoque´es qui correspondent a` l’e´la-
boration transitoire de re´ponses fabulantes [17]. Celles-ci ne
sont pas toujours identifie´es comme des « productions
involontaires de l’esprit » et alors conside´re´es comme des
mensonges alors qu’il n’y aucune intention de tromper.
Certaines productions sont inclassables : les sujets
confabulent spontane´ment sans agir sur leurs confabulations,
mais e´galement « stimule´s » par des questions [15]. Les
confabulations spontane´es, produites sans eˆtre sollicite´es,
re´pondent a` plusieurs caracte´ristiques. Elles ne surviennent
pas tout le temps, par exemple dans la vie, mais pas dans les
tests [6,19]. Le contenu est fantastique [3] ou non [8,15].
Pour certains auteurs, la caracte´ristique principale est le fait
que le sujet agit sur elles [24].
Les observations rapporte´es dans la litte´rature restent rares
et cette rarete´ nous interroge sur les conditions ne´cessaires et
suffisantes a` leur survenue. Elles sont de´crites comme un
symptoˆme majeur du syndrome de Korsakoff et re´gulie`rement
rapporte´es dans les ence´phalites herpe´tiques, la rupture
d’ane´vrisme de l’arte`re communicante ante´rieure, les de´mences
notamment les de´ge´ne´rescences lobaires frontotemporales
(DLFT), diffe´rentes le´sions du lobe frontal et les traumatismes
craˆniens [9,10,21]. Gilboa et Moscovitch (2002) [13] ont, dans
une importante me´ta-analyse, repris 39 e´tudes et analyse´
79 observations de confabulations spontane´es. Dans 48 % des
cas, on ne retrouve pas d’atteinte des aires ce´re´brales
implique´es dans l’amne´sie (hippocampe, corps mamillaire,
thalamus) tandis que le cortex pre´frontal est implique´ dans
81 % des cas. Aucune le´sion ne semble spe´cifique. L’implica-
tion du cortex orbitofrontal est ne´anmoins souvent rapporte´e.
Des atteintes du septum, du fornix, du gyrus cingulaire, de
l’hypothalamus, ou de la teˆte du noyau caude´, isole´es ou plus
souvent associe´es, ont e´galement e´te´ publie´es. Il n’est pas
souligne´ d’effet de late´ralisation en revanche, lors d’une le´sion
pre´frontale ante´rieure et surtout lorsqu’elle implique le cortex
orbitofrontal, les sujets confabulent plus et plus longtemps que
lors d’une le´sion poste´rieure [25].
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traumatisme craˆnien dans l’enfance dont l’observation neu-
ropsychologique peut contribuer a` ce de´bat.
2.1. Cas clinique
Nous avons rencontre´ une jeune femme de 20 ans (ne´e le
30 septembre 1988) qui a e´te´ victime d’un traumatisme craˆnio-
facial se´ve`re, le 7 avril 2001 a` l’aˆge de 12 ans, dans le Centre
spe´cialise´ de re´e´ducation neuropsychologique et d’accompagne-
ment social de L’Adapt-Rhoˆne en 2009. Le score de Glasgow
initial e´tait a` 6 et le coma dura 57 jours. La patiente subit une
de´rivation ventriculaire externe le 12 juillet 2001, une re´paration
me´ninge´e de la base et l’obstruction de fractures orbitaires
gauches et du nasion le 20 juillet 2001 puis une ablation de la
de´rivation le 14 aouˆt 2001 et fut admis dans un Centre de
re´e´ducation le 27 aouˆt 2001. Il fut note´ en 2002, a` 18 mois du
traumatisme, en termes de de´ficiences, chez une enfant droitie`re
une he´mipare´sie gauche ayant bien re´cupe´re´, des troubles
mne´siques avec une amne´sie posttraumatique de six mois
environ, une me´moire ante´rograde de´ficitaire sur le plan verbal et
visuel, des troubles des fonctions exe´cutives, un dysfonctionne-
ment frontal, une ce´cite´ de l’œil gauche. Les nombreux bilans
re´alise´s dans une institution spe´cialise´e me´dicoe´ducative
concluaient en 2008 a` « des difficulte´s d’inhibition (perse´ve´ra-
tions importantes), de me´moire de travail verbale et de flexibilite´
et des de´sordres temporels ». L’IRM objectivait des se´quelles
majeures et diffuses : contusion bifrontale avec aspect aminci du
corps calleux, cavite´ porence´phalique frontale gauche et
dilatation ventriculaire. Elle avait re´ussi un CAP d’agent
polyvalent de restauration, mais elle e´tait en e´chec en stage en
raison de perse´ve´rations et de troubles de comportement. Elle
e´tait qualifie´e de « menteuse » et il e´tait rapporte´ qu’elle « faisait
l’inte´ressante ». La jeune femme se pre´sentait au quotidien,
lorsqu’elle fut observe´e de fac¸on hebdomadaire, dans le centre
des e´le´ments frontaux de type impulsivite´ et logorrhe´e et peu a`
peu l’e´quipe fut conduite a` rapporter des confabulations
spontane´es. Elle pouvait raconter spontane´ment sans aucune
diffe´rence de contexte ou d’e´motion deux souvenirs tels que ceux
pre´sente´s dans l’encadre´. Seul le premier souvenir (au mot pre`s)
s’ave´rait apre`s ve´rification, eˆtre authentique ! Vivant avec son
pe`re, celui-ci te´moignait qu’elle « voulait toujours re´pondre
quelque chose au point qu’il fallait ve´rifier ce qu’elle
entreprenait ». Elle avait pu ainsi lui expliquer le stress que
repre´sentait un expose´ sur Venise qu’elle devait pre´parer et
de´marrer un travail dont nul n’avait jamais parle´.
Exemples de « vrai souvenir » et de confabulation
totale:
Souvenir 1
Hier, j’ai e´ te´ au concert de Myle` ne Farmer avec
mon pe` re et ma sœur. . . On e´ tait tout devant. Mon
pe` re, il avait achete´ les places les plus che` res. Elle
est super ! Elle ne fait pas son aˆ ge, elle fait encore
le grand e´ cart. . . et elle est hyper sexy. Sur lasce` ne, il y avait ses soutiens gorge et j’ai vu sa
culotte jaune, pas chouette. . .
Souvenir 2
Hier soir, mon petit copain, il est venu dıˆner, il est
chiant, il est comme tous les mecs, tu lui donnes
cela et il veut cela. Cela m’a e´ nerve´ e, j’avais fait un
super gueuleton, des paˆ tes avec une super sauce.
On s’est engueule´ : vous savez comme cela fait
avec moi et bien il s’est casse´ et j’ai tout bouffe´ ,
cela va pas m’arranger !
2.2. Les donne´es du bilan neuropsychologique
La patiente a re´alise´ un bilan neuropsychologique classique
(Tableau 1).
Les points principaux sont les suivants. Le Quotient
Intellectuel est normal. La patiente est lente dans toutes les
e´preuves chronome´tre´es sauf la copie de la figure de Rey et le
test des commissions qu’elle re´alise de fac¸on pre´cipite´e en
moins de trois minutes alors qu’elle dispose de 15 minutes pour
le faire. Cette pre´cipitation conduit a` de mauvaises perfor-
mances dans ce test dont la caracte´ristique est d’e´valuer de
fac¸on plus e´cologique les sujets. De meˆme, elle a de tre`s
grandes difficulte´s dans le script du gaˆteau au chocolat [1] alors
qu’elle cuisine tre`s re´gulie`rement chez elle. Les erreurs sont
nombreuses et concernent tous les types d’erreur ; addition,
inversion, commentaires, substitution, omission. Inversement,
elle n’a pas de difficulte´s dans les e´preuves exe´cutives
classiques, hormis la lenteur dans les e´preuves de fluences,
du Stroop, des TMT et meˆme du Wisconsin (e´preuve de
de´cision de re`gles) ou de fac¸on e´tonnante, elle ne perse´ve`re pas.
Toutes les e´preuves d’empans sont faibles. Le Paced Auditory
Serial Addition Test (PASAT), qui est une e´preuve exigeante de
me´moire de travail dans laquelle il s’agit non seulement de
re´pe´ter des se´ries de chiffres, mais de les additionner, doit eˆtre
interrompu. On observe des difficulte´s majeures dans l’e´preuve
attentionnelle du D2 qui consiste a` barrer des lettres en
explorant des lignes de lettres adjacentes sans en omettre
aucune. Le score quantitatif tre`s important dans cette e´preuve,
s’explique par le de´ficit de me´moire de travail. En effet, le
simple fait de retourner la feuille entre l’essai et l’e´preuve suffit
pour qu’elle oublie la consigne. Concernant la me´moire, elle a
des difficulte´s notamment dans les e´preuves ou` l’on ne controˆle
pas l’encodage ; elle ame´liore ses performances dans les
rappels indice´s et en reconnaissance. On note qu’elle ne produit
pas d’intrusions, de fabulations et dans les limites de la norme
des fausses reconnaissances. De fac¸on informelle, on lui
demande de raconter trois contes (parmi un choix de six). Elle
choisit : Le petit chaperon rouge, Les trois petits cochons et
Cendrillon et il est notable de voir que son re´cit est riche,
comporte beaucoup de de´tails, qu’il est teinte´ d’humour et qu’il
n’est enrichi d’aucune fabulation.
Concernant la me´moire biographique, compte tenu du jeune
aˆge de la patiente et du traumatisme survenu avant l’aˆge de
12 ans, nous avons privile´gie´ des e´preuves de fluences
autobiographiques et un questionnaire personnalise´. Elle est
Tableau 1
Bilan neuropsychologique ge´ne´ral.
Tests et e´chelles Scoresa
Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) WAIS-III 96




Indice de Vitesse de Traitement (IVT) WAIS-III 84
Code 7
Symboles 7
Rappel imme´diat du re´cit du lion de Barbizet 10
Re´cit diffe´re´ du re´cit du lion de Barbizet 10
RIM, RL/RI 16 16
Rappels libres 1,2,3, diffe´re´ 8,7,9,6
Rappel total = 47/48 47
Rappel total diffe´re´ 15
Taux d’efficacite´ de l’indic¸age (imme´diat) 95,8 %
Reconnaissance 16
Fausse reconnaissance 1
Rappel des 15 mots de Rey 32
Intrusion 0
Re´pe´tition 3
Reconnaissance des 15 mots de Rey 14
Fausse reconnaissance 1
Rappel imme´diat d’un ensemble (BAT 144 verbal) 4,5
Apprentissage de liste 5,5
Apprentissage de paires associe´es 4
Rappel diffe´re´ d’un ensemble 4
Rappel diffe´re´ d’une liste 4
Reconnaissance diffe´re´e 4
Copie de la figure de Rey 32
Temps de copie 2’24
Rappel de la figure de Rey 3
Rappel imme´diat ensemble (RIE) BAT 144 5,5
Rappel Diffe´re´ Ensemble (RDE) BAT 144 5,5
Empan chiffres endroit/envers 5/3
Empan mots endroit/envers 4/2
Empan spatial endroit/envers 5/4
PASAT Interrompu
Flexibilite´ TEA de Zimmermann
Temps de re´action flexibilite´ 777 ms (Pr 12)
Re´ponses errone´es/aberrantes 5/3
Temps de re´action – Alerte phasique TEA
(Sans) 305ms (Pr 4)
(Avec) 329ms (Pr 2)
Re´ponses aberrantes 4
Temps de re´action- Attention divise´e TEA 728ms (Pr34)
Re´ponses omises/errone´es/aberrantes 2/1/1
D2
GZ (indice performance quantitative) 608
F (indice brut d’erreurs) 289 (48 %)
GZ-F 319
SB (intervalle de variation) 6
KL (indice de performance de concentration) 92
Vitesses de re´alisation TMT B 82
Erreur d’alternance TMT B 0
T score mots Stroop 31
T score couleurs Stroop 33
T score mots/couleurs Stroop 52
Score d’interfe´rence 67
Nombre de cate´gories (Wisconsin) 6
T score nombre d’erreurs 62
T score nombre de re´ponses perse´ve´ratives 79
T score nombre de re´ponses non perse´ve´ratives 63
T score niveau conceptuel de re´ponse 61
Temps de re´alisation (test des commissions) 2mn48
Tableau 1 (Continued )
Tests et e´chelles Scoresa
Score de solution 10
Cote 50
Test du gaˆteau au chocolat
Erreurs 12
Appre´ciation 1
PASAT: Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test.
a Les scores pathologiques sont exprime´s en italique et en gras.
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ge´ne´alogique sur trois ge´ne´rations (24 individus) sans difficulte´
chronologique et elle peut donner des informations sur chacun
d’entre eux. Elle a pu produire correctement des noms de
proches et des e´ve`nements personnels (en pre´cisant chaque fois
le contenu, le lieu, l’e´poque, le contexte e´motionnel de
survenue). Surtout, elle a pu pour chaque e´ve´nement pre´ciser le
degre´ d’e´pisodicite´ selon une proce´dure Know/Remember/
Guess (K/R/G) et un point de vue d’acteur ou de spectateur
[12,23] (Tableau 2). Nous avons eu l’opportunite´ de ve´rifier que
les informations e´taient conformes a` la re´alite´, avec son accord
et son pe`re. Concernant 20 confabulations produites spontane´-
ment aux cours de nos entretiens hebdomadaires sur une
pe´riode de six mois (controˆle´s selon leur contenu avec la
famille ou les professionnels), nous avons note´ que chaque fois
la patiente produisait des informations concernant les de´tails, le
lieu, le temps, l’e´motion de l’e´pisode comme lors de la
production d’un vrai souvenir (voir encadre´). Nous l’avons
invite´e a` se situer dans la position actrice ou spectatrice du
souvenir, la proce´dure K/R/G n’ayant pas pu eˆtre re´alise´e toutes
les fois (la patiente la jugeant trop difficile et la refusant).
Aucune des fabulations ne suscitait la re´ponse « actrice » et
distinguait ainsi clairement les falsifications de 20 vrais
souvenirs qui ge´ne´raient dans 70 % des cas ce type de re´ponses
(souvenir 1 : acteur ; souvenir 2 : re´ponse spectateur).
Enfin, la patiente a e´te´ invite´e a` donner 20 informations
concernant le self par e´crit, a` partir des assertions : je suis
(Je suis la sœur de mon fre`re, gourmande, en pleine forme, en
jean, trop grosse.), j’ai, je fais. Elle re´alise chaque catalogue en
moins de trois minutes ! Les re´ponses sont adapte´es et lui
correspondent bien.
2.3. Discussion
Le statut cognitif des sujets qui confabulent est tre`s variable.
Le roˆle du syndrome dysexe´cutif est notamment discute´ : lesTableau 2
E´preuves de fluences autobiographiques.
Fluence autobiographique n K/R/G Acteur/Spectateur
Noms proches < 12 ans 20 – –
Noms proches 12–19 ans 21 – –
Noms proches dernie`re anne´e 18 – –
E´ve`nement < 12 ans 7 1/5/1 5/2
E´ve`nement 12–19 ans 7 0/5/2 5/2
E´ve`nement dernie`re anne´e 9 0/6/3 6/3
K/R/G: Know/Remember/Guess.
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ments d’imitation et aux perse´ve´rations [18] meˆme si de rares
cas ne le sont pas [6]. Toutefois, ces cas sont anciens, les tests
e´valuant le dysfonctionnement frontal sont peu nombreux et les
confabulations e´taient essentiellement provoque´es. « La pre´-
sence d’un de´ficit mne´sique est un facteur important pour
expliquer la pre´sence [l’absence] de confabulation, mais c’est
la gravite´ du de´ficit exe´cutif qui de´terminerait la gravite´ de la
confabulation » sugge`re de fac¸on prudente, Fisher et al. (1995)
[11].
La patiente, dont l’histoire est rapporte´e, pre´sente un tableau
clinique classique de confabulations spontane´es ; ceux-ci sont
rares dans la litte´rature. Une des particularite´s est sa survenue
apre`s un traumatisme craˆnien se´ve`re de l’enfance alors que le
self est encore en cours de de´veloppement. Il est inte´ressant de
souligner la difficulte´ qu’il existe parfois a` identifier les
confabulations, notamment lorsqu’elles ne comportent pas
d’e´le´ments fantastiques [6–8]. Ainsi dans ce cas, la famille
pensait que la jeune femme racontait souvent n’importe quoi
— au point de devoir ve´rifier — par « queˆte d’identite´ et besoin
d’exister ». De meˆme malgre´ de nombreuses e´valuations au fil
des anne´es et l’observation en centre de re´adaptation, les
productions semblent avoir e´te´ noye´es dans le tableau
comportemental frontal associant perse´ve´rations et impulsivite´
a` un aˆge ou` les enfants et ce d’autant plus qu’ils sont en
souffrance, sont supposer souvent mentir. Il nous a e´te´
impossible de pre´ciser si celles-ci sont survenues imme´diate-
ment au de´cours du traumatisme ou au fil du temps. Il a de´ja` e´te´
souligne´ dans la litte´rature, les liens possibles — sans que cela
ne soit force´ment de cause a` effet — entre cette symptoma-
tologie et la survenue des confabulations. Ici force est de
constater que le tableau comportemental frontal a pu occulter
les confabulations et les faire conside´rer comme ce qu’elles ne
sont pas : des mensonges ou des affabulations [16,20].
Les le´sions ce´re´brales sont massives et impliquent entre
autres la re´gion orbitofrontale. Il est impossible dans ce dossier
d’en dire davantage et de tirer la moindre conclusion
anatomoclinique.
La patiente est amne´sique, mais nous notons qu’elle ne fait
ni intrusion, ni fabulation, ni fausse reconnaissance [6,19] dans
les tests, y compris lorsqu’elle doit raconter des contes. Ce
point est a` l’encontre d’une hypothe`se psychopathologique.
Elle n’est pas suggestible (Pick, 1905) [22]. Lorsqu’elle est en
e´chec, elle ne met pas en place de me´canismes de de´fense en
fournissant de fausses re´ponses (Weinstein et Kahn, 1955) [29],
pas plus qu’elle ne cherche a` combler le vide (gap filling),
Barbizet (1963) [2]. Il est inte´ressant de souligner que dans
l’e´vocation d’e´ve´nements ou de savoirs autobiographiques, la
patiente ne fabule pas et est compe´tente. Cela rejoint les
donne´es de Burgess et Shallice (1986) [4] e´voquant un trouble
tre`s particulier de la me´moire autobiographique. De plus,
Conway (2005) [5] a propose´ que le self a` long terme soit au
sein de la me´moire autobiographique, une structure de
connaissances personnelles servant a` organiser les souvenirs
que nous avons de nos expe´riences personnelles. Le self
conceptuel regroupe ainsi des attitudes, des valeurs, des
croyances garantes de l’inte´grite´ et de la continuite´ de celui-ci.Cette jeune femme appre´cie bien ce qui le compose dans des
e´preuves ou` elle doit e´voquer je suis, j’ai, je fais. Ainsi les
fabulations — certes dans un contexte de me´moire a` long terme
de´ficitaire — ne semblent pas combler au sens strict, un vide
biographique ni un de´sordre identitaire et surviennent
effectivement dans un e´tat de « conscience claire » [3].
Les confabulations surgissent a` l’emporte-pie`ce alors que la
patiente n’a pas le temps de re´fle´chir pouvant faire penser a` une
impossibilite´ de s’autocontroˆler, Stuss (1978) [27], ou de
s’autocorriger, Shapiro (1981) [26]. Dans cette ligne, la patiente
est lente dans les e´preuves de temps de re´action et n’a pas de
difficulte´s pour les e´preuves de flexibilite´ et d’alerte phasique.
Elle montre de tre`s grandes difficulte´s dans le D2 qui est pe´nalise´
par son impulsivite´ qui est le trouble dysexe´cutif le plus marque´
chez elle. En revanche, la patiente re´alise au prix d’un temps
ralenti correctement le Stroop, les TMT et le Wisconsin. De
meˆme, l’impulsivite´ la conduit a` re´aliser « trop vite » le test des
commissions. En ge´ne´ration de script, les choses ne se corrigent
pas, bien au contraire. La taˆche du gaˆteau au chocolat tre`s simple
[1] est e´choue´e, la patiente se pre´cipitant et/ou ayant son attention
capte´e par mille stimulations.
Une composante importante de la confabulation rapporte´e
par les auteurs anciens pourrait eˆtre un facteur temporel, Van
der Horst, 1932 [8]. Ici, la patiente n’a pas de de´sorientation
temporelle, d’incohe´rence chronologique dans sa biographie,
ou de trouble du self conceptuel. On voit toutefois qu’elle
associe lenteur et pre´cipitation. Elle a un de´ficit important en
me´moire de travail. Le PASAT est irre´alisable alors qu’elle a pu
par exemple re´aliser les e´preuves du TEA ou le Wisconsin. La
difficulte´ particulie`re a` empeˆcher la ge´ne´ration de fictions
pourrait traduire un proble`me de controˆle en me´moire a` court
terme et du « self de travail ». Celui-ci intervient dans le
processus de reconstruction des souvenirs autobiographiques et
il est constitue´ par un ensemble complexe de processus de
controˆle dirige´ par les buts du sujet, ses de´sirs et ses croyances
j[5]. L’acce`s direct au souvenir est relativement rare et il est
largement admis qu’un certain nombre de reconstructions
directes sont illusoires et auraient pour fonction de sauvegarder la
cohe´rence de soi (Guyard & Piolino, 2006) [14]. Dans ce cas de
confabulation plausible et jamais fantastique, on peut se
demander si les processus de controˆle de plausibilite´ sont
emballe´s et/ou si la patiente n’a pas ou ne prend pas le temps des
les mettre en route. On ne peut exclure, rejoignant les auteurs
anciens [22], que ce phe´nome`ne comble un de´faut de self de
travail, afin d’assurer la continuite´ psychique de la patiente et ce
d’autant plus que le traumatisme est survenu toˆt dans la vie.
Le fait d’avoir reconnu les confabulations a eu trois
conse´quences cliniques. La premie`re a e´te´ d’expliquer le
symptoˆme neurologique, a` la patiente et a` la famille sans la
culpabiliser d’avoir conside´re´ la jeune femme comme « une
menteuse ». La deuxie`me fut d’aider l’expert dans la re´daction
de son rapport concernant les se´quelles de l’accident. En effet,
e´videmment nul ne pouvait nier celles-ci, mais il convenait
aussi de nuancer la relative pre´servation des capacite´s
cognitives et par exemple l’obtention d’un diploˆme (CAP)
par l’existence d’un tableau comportemental dysexe´cutif se´ve`re
ayant des re´percussions familiales et sociales. Enfin, il a e´te´
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l’ambition de bloquer le phe´nome`ne et ce avec la patiente qui
en avait bien compris une condition ne´cessaire, mais pas
suffisante : l’impulsivite´ et avait repe´re´ le statut particulier de
ces souvenirs. Ainsi il fut sugge´re´ chaque fois que possible
d’attendre avant de parler et de ne pas le faire si le souvenir e´tait
un savoir avec un point de vue de spectateur et non une
reviviscence avec un souvenir d’acteur. Nous n’avons pas de
donne´es a` ce jour suffisantes pour conclure.
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